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Introduction
Crawford and Sobel's seminal paper (1982) concerning one-shot sender-receiver games is an essential reference for most of the literature in strategic information transmission. In particular, multi-stage games often rely on the uniqueness of per-stage equilibrium solutions. However, Crawford and Sobel substantially assume that equilibria are unique.
In particular, Crawford and Sobel (1982) consider the following one-shot game of strategic communication. The payoff of two agents, N and E, depend on action a and the true state of the world ω. Agent N has prior beliefs about the state of the world, that are represented by a non-degenerate distribution function. Instead, agent E can observe the true state perfectly. First, agent E sends a message to agent N, then agent N chooses action a and the payoff are realized. Crawford and Sobel show that Nash Bayesian equilibria are partitional: agent E will introduce noise into his signal so that only one action will be implemented for all the states that belong to the same element of the equilibrium Assumption 2 : the scalar parameter b is such that in (4) the best action a E ω for a perfectly informed agent E is always lower than the best action a N ω for a perfectly informed agent N 1 . Only agent E observes the true state of nature. Instead, agent N has prior beliefs about the state of nature that are represented by the distribution function (d.f.) F (ω), with continuous probability density function f (ω) such that f (ω) > 0 for every ω in (0, 1) 2 . First, agent E observes ω, then he chooses and sends one message m to agent N. The cardinality of the set M of messages is not lower than the cardinality of Ω. Agent N receives message m and, then, he chooses one action a in A. Once the action is selected by agent N , the payoffs are realized.
All aspects of the game except ω are common knowledge.
Agent E chooses a message rule, i.e. a set of generalized probability density functions, denoted {ϕ(m | ω)}, with cardinality |Ω|, such that M ϕ(m | ω)dm = 1 for each state ω. Agent N chooses an action rule, i.e. a set of generalized probability density functions, denoted {α (a | m)}, with cardinality |M|, such that A α(a | m)da = 1 for each message m. Let ρ (ω | m) denote agent N 's probability density function of ω conditional on having received message m. A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a pair of message rule {ϕ * (m | ω}) and action rule {α * (a | m)}, and a system of beliefs {ρ * (ω | m)} such that: 1) the equilibrium message rule maximizes agent E's expected payoff for every state ω given the equilibrium action rule;
2) the equilibrium action rule maximizes agent N 's expected payoff for every message m where the expectation satisfies the following condition:
Results
Proposition 1 is Theorem 1 in Crawford and Sobel (1982, p.1437) adapted to Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, instead of Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1 : 1) every Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is partitional, i.e.: -there exists a partition of
elements of the partition at least; the equilibrium message rule is such that:
1 All the results hold for the analogous case in which a E ω is always greater than a N ω . 2 If the density function f (ω) were nil for non-empty subsets of the state space, then there could be different partitions of the state space substantially equivalent with respect to the induced action profile, given the prior beliefs.
-There exists a profile of I * actions denoted a * i , is such that:
2) Every equilibrium partition has a finite number I * of elements. 3) If there exists an equilibrium partition with cardinality I * > 1, then there will be an equilibrium partition with cardinality (I * − 1).
Given a d.f. H(ω), let a H denote the unique action such that:
Moreover, let P * H,I * denote the equilibrium partition of the state space with cardinality I * under the d.f. H(ω). Crawford and Sobel (1982, p.1444) assume that the following monotonicity condition holds in equilibrium:
Condition M implies that there will be a unique equilibrium partition for each cardinality of the partitions: if P thanĨ * . The paper shows that the one-to-one correspondence between cardinality and equilibrium partition will not hold if Crawford and Sobel's monotonicity condition is dropped. The following Corollary and Lemma are useful in order to prove that multiple equilibrium partitions with the same cardinality can exist.
In particular, Lemma 1 shows that identical action profiles will be induced under prior distribution functions defined on the same support and having equal mean, provided U N aωω (•) is equal to zero 3 .
is a necessary condition for the existence of P * F,I * with I * > 1.
Proposition 2 proves in the following way that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique. Suppose that under the prior d.f. in the following way. there exists a unique P * F,I * with the correspondingly unique equilibrium action profile a F,I * . Consider another d.f. G (ω) that both satisfies the marginal likelihood ratio property with respect to the prior d.f. F (ω), and induces a unique P with unique equilibrium action profile a G,I * . First-order stochastic dominance between the distribution functions and MLRP will imply a complete ordering of the upper and lower bounds of all the subsets in P * F,I * and P * G,I * . Given that ranking, there will exist another d.f. Y (ω), that is a mixture of distribution functions, under which the set of equilibrium partitions with cardinality I * contains both P * F,I * and P * G,I * .
Proposition 2 : suppose that there exists a unique P * F,I * with I * > 1. Provided U N aωω (•) = 0, there exist other distribution functions Y (ω) such that the set of P * Y,I * is non-singular and contains P * F,I * .
Given Proposition 2 there can be different equilibrium action profiles notwithstanding the same cardinality of the equilibrium partitions: under the d.f. Y (ω) both a F,I * and a G,I * will be equilibrium action profiles.
Proposition 3 shows that an equilibrium message rule is not unique even in correspondence to a unique P * F,I * . In particular, represent agent N's posterior beliefs as distribution functions. If an equilibrium message rule supports a posterior d.f. H (ω), then all the message rules inducing posterior distribution functions with the same mean of H (ω) and rankable with respect to H (ω) according to second-order stochastic dominance will be equilibrium message rules.
Proposition 3 : suppose that there exists a unique P * 
Conclusions
The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982) . Consequently, there is not a correspondence which associates with each cardinality of the equilibrium partitions one and only one equilibrium action profile for every prior distribution function. Moreover, the equilibrium message rules and beliefs are not unique for given prior beliefs.
Non-uniqueness of one-shot equilibria can be relevant for multi-stage games of strategic communication.
Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 1
Step 1. From strict concavity in (2), there will be a unique action that maximizes agent i's expected payoff function for each d.f. F (ω). Hence, agent N will never use mixed strategies, whatever his beliefs {ρ(ω | m)}. Agent N 's action rule will be a functionã(m) : M → A M where:
Suppose that the d.f. H (ω) dominates the d.f. K(ω) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. Let a H and a K denote the action levels such that:
From (3), (8) and (2) it follows that:
From (9) the best value of a for the fully informed agent i in (4) is a continuous, strictly monotonic function of the true value of ω, i.e.:
Let A i be the set of the a i ω in (4). Given (1):
From (7) and (11):
Let:
Consequently, I ≤ min |M| , A N .
Step 2. Rank all the elements in A M in the following way:
By construction,
From (3) the utility functions have increasing differences in (a, ω) (MilgromShannon (1994)), i.e.:
From (16):
Finally from (15) and (17):
From (14) − (18):
Finally, given A M , let {φ(m | ω)} denote the message rule that maximizes agent E's payoff. From (19) − (20):
Step 3. Let:
From (9) and (19) − (21) a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium must be such that:
Step 4. From Assumption (2), since a
Suppose that in equilibrium some Ω * i is such that
given (19) and continuity, then Ω * i+1 = ∅ and there will a ω ′′ such that a
∈ Ω * j with j ≥ i + 1, that is contradictory. Instead, ifω = 1, given (16) and continuity, then Ω * i−1 = ∅ and U E (a * i ,ω, b) − U E a * i−1 ,ω, b will be strictly positive, while U E (a * i , ω i−1 , b) − U E a * i−1 , ω i−1 , b will be strictly negative:
there will be a ω
and Ω * i+2 = ∅. However, given (10) and continuity, there will be a ω ′′ such that a
and there will be a ω
∈ Ω * j with j < i, that is contradictory. Hence, given (13), a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium must be such that:
:
Step 5. There always exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with a unique action level played with probability one. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium partition with cardinality I * greater than 1 and:
It follows that U E (a, ω, b) is first increasing and then decreasing from a * i−1 to a * i+1 . Hence, there will be couples of actions,
Since there exists an equilibrium partition with cardinality I * , then:
Consider all the partitions of the type:
, there will exist an equilibrium partition with cardinality (I * − 1). Proof. of Corollary 1 From Proposition 1 point 3, if there exists a P * F,I * with I * > 2, there will exists an equilibrium P * F,2 . Consider an equilibrium P * F,2 . The following condition must hold:
Let
. From (6), a F1 (q) and a F2 (q) will be unique for every q.
, that is greater than U E (a F2 (q), 1, b). Given increasing differences in (16), U E (a F 1 (q), ω, b) will be greater than U E (a F 2 (q), ω, b) for every ω ∈ Ω, in contradiction with (23).
Proof. of Lemma 1
Proof. of Proposition 2 Suppose that under the d.f. F (ω) there exists a unique equilibrium with equilibrium actions a * F1 , a * F2 , and equilibrium P *
Consider the set Ψ of distribution functions G (ω) with continuous density functions g (ω) such that (g/f ) is decreasing on Ω (MLRP, (Karlin-Rubin (1956) ). Hence, each G (ω) is dominated by F (ω) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. Given MLRP:
There will be some d.f.G (ω) in Ψ such that the expected ω underG (ω),
F1 , a F . Given strict concavity in (2), under the d.f.G the necessary condition stated by Corollary 1 will be satisfied. Hence, under the d.f.G there will exists a unique equilibrium with equilibrium actions a * G1
, a * G2
, and equilibrium P * G,2
will be lower than ω * F . Hence:
on Ω 3 such that:
where α i ≥ 0 and i α i = 1. The d.f. Y (ω) is a mixture of the d.f. H i (ω). Provided:
then:
Given Lemma 1, under the d.f. Y (ω) both P * F,2 and P * G,2 will be equilibrium partitions.
Proof. of Proposition 3 Under Assumption 2, let F i (ω) be the d.f. F (ω) conditional on Ω i = [ω i , ω i ] with ω i < ω i , and f i (ω) be its density function, continuous at each point of Ω i . Then, [ωf i (ω)] is integrable on Ω i , and f i (ω) is positive for every ω ∈ (ω i , ω i ). Letω = E F i [ω] . Choose a ω ′ in (ω i ,ω). Then 
, and H D (ω) dominates H C (ω) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. Hence:
From the intermediate value theorem for continuous functions, there exists a ω ′′ in (ω, ω i ) such that:
from (26) it follows that:
